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This paper studies the implications of di⁄erent public pension systems on
fertility and economic growth. Employing a three period overlapping gener-
ations endogenous growth model we compare the di⁄erent impacts of pay-as-
you-go-, fully funded- and informal pension systems. The novelty of our work
lies in the formulation of altruism that is assumed to be one sided (descending)
for economies represented by a public pension system and two sided (descend-
ing and ascending) for economies with informal pension systems. Through the
incorporation of a mixed procreation motive we can study the case of fully
crowded out intrafamilial transfers inside a public pension system model while
still capturing fertility endogenously.
We show that the introduction of public pension systems to a developing
economy reduce fertility and stimulate economic growth. Through a comparison
of the di⁄erent public pension systems we highlight that a fully funded pension
system results in higher economic growth compared to a pay-as-you-go one
despite higher fertility because the growth enhancing e⁄ect of the higher capital
stock is dominant. This suggests that observed fertility and growth di⁄erences
between the US and Europe can partly be explained by the di⁄erent types of
pension systems.
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11 Introduction
Developing economies are usually facing a whole bundle of obstacles on their
way to development. Overpopulation, political instability and insecure property
rights are only some of the problems. Our work tries to contribute to the topic by
analyzing the secondary goal of pensions, the in￿ uence on fertility and economic
growth.
While di⁄erent works are dealing with growth and population e⁄ects of pay-
as-you-go pension systems (Zhang (1995) and Boldrin, De Nardi, Jones (2005))
the ￿rst part of our study is focusing on the impact of funded and unfunded
public pension system introduction to a developing economy where informal
contributions ￿nance pension bene￿ts.
Holzmann (2005) observes that only 1/5th of the working population in
Sub-Saharan Africa is covered by a public pension system and that the biggest
part of the contributions is used for the ine¢ cient and bureaucratic organiza-
tional structure of the systems. This is supporting our idea of solely informally
￿nanced developing country pension systems. In this context the paper by
Zhang and Zhang (1995) is closest to our work. They show that the introduc-
tion of a pay-as-you-go public pension system compared to a fertility dependent
one leads to positive growth e⁄ects because fertility decreases and savings in-
crease. In contrast to their approach our work assumes, that the existence of a
public pension system fully crowds out the old age security motive. Therefore
we exclude the voluntary, non mandatory intergenerational transfers from adult
children to their parents if a working public pension system is present. While
this does not change the qualitative behavior of the model, it reduces the posi-
tive growth e⁄ect because the negative e⁄ect of pay-as-you-go contributions on
capital accumulation through decreased savings can not be o⁄set by decreased
gifts.
Our assumption of fully crowded out gifts in the light of public pension sys-
tems is following Caldwells theory of intergenerational wealth ￿ ows (Caldwell
(1982)) which de￿nes two di⁄erent types of societies. The ￿modern￿ society
covers the case of developed countries which are in our work de￿ned by a work-
ing public pension system. In these economies children are not expected to
contribute to the retirement income of the parents because private savings and
2public pension payments are high enough to o⁄er a su¢ cient level of retirement
consumption. Therefore the public pension system takes over the role of the
private intrafamilial intergenerational transfers and reduces procreation bene-
￿ts which leads to lower fertility rates. Although private gifts are in reality of
course present for developed economies, we argue that in these societies they
occur only occasionally and households do not consider them in their optimiza-
tion. In other words adults do not expect their own retirement income to be
dependent on the number of own children. The second so called ￿traditional￿
society is characterized by high fertility since children directly contribute to the
parental retirement budget. Translating this to our framework means that pri-
vate intrafamilial gifts take place, or in other words a developing society values
the old age security motive of fertility.
Within the pension system and endogenous fertility literature two motives of
having children are prominent. The ￿rst motive captures the fact that individu-
als are expected to procreate because they expect their children to contribute to
their retirement budget. Due to its insurance character this motive is known as
the old age security motive of fertility (Leibenstein (1957)). The second so called
consumption good motive of fertility states that parents simply enjoy the fact
to have a successor and see children as a durable consumption good (Dasgupta
(1993) and Zhang (1995)). Here children are treated as o⁄ering utility only by
their existence. Our work picks up the idea of a mixed fertility motive ￿rst
introduced by Wigger (1999), where both the insurance and consumption good
motive determine fertility. Since pension bene￿ts which are ￿nanced through
a public pension system are independent on individual fertility, models deter-
mining fertility endogenously have to include altruistic intrafamilial transfers in
the form of gifts from adult children to their parents (Bental (1989), Zhang and
Nishimura (1993)). We can abstract from these gifts since the inclusion of the
consumption good motive enables us to treat fertility endogenously also for the
public pension system cases where the old age security motive is not existent
because private intergenerational gifts are fully crowded out.
While our two model societies are expected to di⁄er in their valuation of the
old age security motive, we expect both to incorporate the consumption good
motive because procreation is a basic need for human beings. This is creating
the view of children as a durable consumption good.
Our work deals with the two societies by formulating corresponding scenar-
ios inside a Diamond type overlapping generations model where the engine of
growth is formed through labor productivity. While the ￿rst scenario describes
3the situation of a developing economy with an informal pension system and de-
rives corresponding fertility and economic growth the second and third scenario
examine the cases of pay-as-you-go and fully funded public pension systems.
The comparison of the di⁄erent outcomes enables us to show the impacts of
di⁄erent pension system introductions to a developing economy. Furthermore
we analyze the role of di⁄erent pension systems on fertility and growth level
di⁄erences observed for the US and Europe.
Since the theoretical examination leaves certain questions unanswered we
calibrate the model for observed average OECD and Sub-Saharan African total
fertility and per capita production growth data.
2 Model
The basic framework of our study forms a Diamond type OLG model. The econ-
omy is populated by ￿nitely living agents belonging to three generations. Each
individual lives for three periods: childhood, adulthood and retirement. During
childhood individuals consume ￿Wt, where ￿ is the fraction of working time
needed to rear one child. While child costs are usually split in time and good
costs (Morand (1996)) without loss of generality we abstract from this formula-
tion. During adulthood households decide about fertility nt, adult consumption
ct, and future retirement consumption ct+1. The population dynamics for the
productive adult population are described by Nt+1 = Ntnt. Retired people only
consume and have no in￿ uence on household optimization. Our model does not
include bequests. Retired agents are therefore assumed to consume their whole
savings plus pension bene￿ts during their third period of life.
Following Zhang (1995) and Doepke, De La Croix (2003) individuals pref-
erences include a descending altruistic part capturing the consumption good
motive of fertility. This approach can be seen as a modi￿cation of the Barro
and Becker (1989) dynastic utility function. In contrast to their idea that adults
incorporate the whole utility of their o⁄springs in the utility function we assume
that parents value only the number of children. In other words we exclude the
dynastic component of the Barro-Becker descending altruism.
Next to the consumption good motive of fertility we additionally model
the old age security motive of fertility by incorporating ascending altruism.
Inspired by Caldwells intergenerational ￿ ow theory we de￿ne di⁄erent scenarios
to capture the fact that ascending altruism is only present for countries without
4a mandatory public pension system. Following Morand (1996) the ascending
altruism of individual￿ s preferences is captured through gifts from the own adult
children to their parents during retirement. These gifts only take place if a
minimum retirement consumption level is not reached and can be viewed as free
private intergenerational transfers. The ascending altruistic part of preferences
is therefore captured in the composition of pension payments ￿t+1.
We assume that individuals utility is represented by the following logarithmic
additive separable function:
Vt = log(ct) + ￿ log(ct+1) + ￿ log(nt) (1)
Utility is dependent on adult consumption ct, retirement consumption ct+1,
discount factor ￿, descending altruism factor ￿ and the number of children nt.
We assume ￿;￿ < 1.
The household budget constraint is represented by adult age consumption
ct and old age consumption ct+1 . Adult consumption is dependent on wage,
child rearing cost ￿nt, pension contributions Wt￿ and savings st. Pension con-
tributions are formulated as an income tax ￿. We additionally assume perfect
foresight implying that individuals exactly know the future gross interest rate
Rt+1 at which savings are interested. Old age consumption is ￿nanced through
interested savings and pension bene￿ts. Notice that the pension system is as-
sumed to be always budget balanced.
ct = Wt(1 ￿ ￿nt ￿ ￿) ￿ st (2)
ct+1 = stRt+1 + ￿t+1 (3)
2.1 Informal pension arrangement
In this section the situation of a developing country is modeled. While there
are a lot of di⁄erences between developing and developed countries in reality
we are only focusing on the variations of retirement income composition. De-
veloping countries are mainly represented by a not existent or unreliable public
pension system that only covers a small part of the population resulting in re-
tirement budget that is below a minimum1. This implies that savings alone
are not enough to ￿nance a su¢ cient level of retirement consumption. For this
1The World Bank."Averting the Old Age Security Crises": page 63 and 192.
5reason we assume children to take over the role of the public pension system and
￿nance the pensions of their parents through private contributions resulting in
ascending altruism. Caldwell motivated developing societies high fertility lev-
els exactly by these informal intrafamilial retirement age income contributions.
Di⁄erent empirical facts support our assumption. Due to the World Bank 70%
of the old throughout the world rely exclusively on informal pension arrange-
ments. International pension coverage data mentioned in the World Bank report
additionally shows that low public pension system coverage rates correlate with
a high percentage of inhabitants being supported by their own family while for
high coverage rates the opposite is true2. Further evidence from developing
country surveys (Arnold et. al. (1975), Kagitvibasi (1982)) also indicates that
old age security certainly is a fertility motive in developing countries3.
Although private intrafamilial transfers are usually freely chosen by the fam-
ily members we abstract from heterogeneity in contributions because developing
country contributions are often socially mandatory. This means that individuals
are forced to contribute by the threat of punishment which can take the form
of exclusion from social village life. Therefore we assume that the contribution
rate ￿ is not a decision variable but socially determined and constant over time.
2.1.1 Production
The economy is populated by one representative ￿rm that uses the production
factors capital Kt and e⁄ective labour AtLt to produce a single homogeneous
good at time t. At determines labour productivity at time t which is assumed to
be driven through a Romer type positive spillover. In equilibrium labor demand
Lt equals labor supply which is determined by the adult population Nt. The
aggregate production function is determined by:
Yt = F(Kt;AtNt) (4)
Following Grossman and Yanagawa (1993) the technological spillover is depen-
dent on the fraction of capital per worker and the parameter m which is a
positive technology parameter controlling for the in￿ uence of capital intensity
on labor productivity. The lower m the higher is the productivity of labour.
2Nigeria and Kenya show the highest percentage (95% and 88% ) of population over 60
covered by family transfers, while public pension coverage rate for these countries is almost
zero. The World Bank."Averting the Old Age Security Crises": page 57 table 2.1.






Now de￿ne capital per e⁄ective unit of labour with kt. From (5) we follow that





b kt = Atm (7)
Pro￿t maximization of the ￿rm implies that production factors are paid by their
marginal products.
F0
L(Kt;AtNt) = Wt = [f(kt) ￿ f0(kt)kt]At (8)
F0
K(Kt;AtNt) = f0(kt) = Rt (9)
Since ￿rm pro￿ts are distributed to capital owners, cleared capital markets
imply that the return on savings is equal to the marginal product of capital.
Equation (8) and (9) imply that capital and labor markets are cleared. Due to
Walras￿law capital market and labour market clearing together also imply a
cleared goods market.
Now use capital and labor market clearing conditions together with the fact
that capital per e¢ cient unit of labor is constant over time (see equation (6))
to state that gross interest rate Rt and wage per e¢ cient unit wt = Wt
At are
constant.
Rt = f0(m) = R (10)
wt = [f(m) ￿ f0(m)m] = w (11)
From the labor market clearing condition we can furthermore see that wage is
growing with the level of labor productivity At. This enables us to describe











Because retirement consumption before gifts is assumed to be below a su¢ cient
level, ascending altruistic transfers in the form of children contributing to their
parents retirement budget take place. These gifts can be seen as a kind of
private intrafamilial pension system. Gifts o⁄ered to the parents are measured
through our pension bene￿t variable ￿t+1.
A balanced budget pension system demands that bene￿ts equal contributions
at every point in time. This is implying that the number of own children nt
times the part of children￿ s adult income o⁄ered as a gift to their parents ￿Wt+1
has to equal the pension bene￿ts ￿t+1.
￿t+1 = ￿ntWt+1 (13)
(1), (2), (3) and (13) describe the problem of a representative developing country
household.
Vt = log(ct) + ￿ log(ct+1) + ￿ log(nt)
ct = Wt(1 ￿ ￿nt ￿ ￿) ￿ st
ct+1 = stRt+1 + ￿ntWt+1
The utility function captures the consumption good value of children, the
retirement budget constraint re￿ ects the insurance value. Households choose














Adults can decide whether to spend their money in the ￿rst or second period.
The optimal decision of splitting overall consumption between the two periods
is represented by equation (14), which states that marginal utility of adult con-
sumption has to equal marginal utility of retirement consumption. An increase
in interest rates or a higher discount factor imply that consumption today will be
skipped for consumption tomorrow. At an optimum marginal bene￿t of actual
consumption has to equal discounted marginal bene￿t of future consumption.
Equation (15) deals with cost and bene￿t of having a child. It states that at
8an optimum the marginal cost of child rearing must equal the present value of
marginal bene￿t gained through the birth of a child. Marginal bene￿t of having a
child (the right hand side of equation (15)) consists of two parts representing our
idea of modelling a mixed procreation motive. The ￿rst part (
￿
nt) is re￿ ecting
the consumption good value while the second part (
￿￿Wt+1
ct+1 ), measuring the
present value of marginal bene￿t of child investments arising in period t + 1, is
capturing the security value.
Solving the two equations for fertility and savings, followed by algebraic
reformulation leads to optimal household decisions (16) and (17).
st =
(1 ￿ ￿)Wt((￿ + ￿)￿Wt+1 ￿ ￿￿Rt+1Wt)




(1 + ￿ + ￿)(￿Rt+1Wt ￿ ￿Wt+1)
(17)
Our assumption of homogeneous agents implies that aggregate savings can
not be negative. Use this fact together with optimal savings (16) to follow that
net present marginal value of child investment used as savings instead of being
spent on child rearing (left hand side of (18)) has to be equal or higher than
marginal bene￿t that arises by having a child (right hand side of (18)).




Through the use of Wt+1 = gWt and equation (10) we can rewrite (18) in
constant terms:




Equation (19) implies that the bene￿ts of the two di⁄erent types of intertempo-
ral transfers of income from consumption in period t to consumption in period
t + 1(savings and fertility) are weighted against each other. Households would
optimally choose zero or negative savings if child investment would pay equal
or more than saving investment. If the left hand side is smaller than the right
hand side agents would be willing to borrow money since child investment re-
turns would compensate the interest cost of such loans. In these cases third
period consumption would solely be ￿nanced through interested fertility invest-
ments. The equality sign holds if households are indi⁄erent between the two
investment opportunities. Equation (19) again highlights the twofold value of




Besides non-negativity of aggregate savings we also have to secure that opti-
mal fertility can not become negative or in￿nite. Therefore the child rearing cost
interested in the capital market in the form of savings have to be higher than the
bene￿t parents get from the insurance motive of having children alone. If this
would not be the case parents would take loans to ￿nance in￿nitely many chil-
dren since the interest on child investments (insurance plus consumption good
value) is higher than on savings. This would again imply negative aggregate
savings which are not possible in our model.
￿R > ￿g
Combine both conditions and assume that aggregate savings are positive to
show that the only case where fertility and savings are well behaved (positive
and ￿nite) is where:




Now rearrange this condition to show that our model implies a maximum







Capital market equilibrium demands that future capital is equal to actual aggre-
gate savings plus depreciated capital. Since in our model only old people, who
do not leave any bequests and totally use up their savings are holding capital,
capital market equilibrium is described by:
Kt+1 = stNt
2.1.4 Equilibrium Analysis
Production- and household optimization together with the capital market equi-
librium close the model by de￿ning a competitive equilibrium with intergener-
ational transfers. From equation (12) we already know that per capita output
10growth is solely de￿ned by labor productivity growth g. Use (5) and the capital
market equilibrium to reproduce the in the endogenous growth theory literature
well known feature (Grossmann, Yanagawa (1993)) of growth enhancing savings















(5), (12) and the optimal household solutions for savings and fertility lead to:
g =
(￿￿Rt+1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)￿g)wt
￿Rt+1m




￿￿w + ￿￿w + m￿R
(20)




(1 + ￿ + ￿)(￿R ￿ ￿g)
Use the already obtained value for g to fully solve for fertility.
n =
(1 ￿ ￿)(w(￿ + ￿)￿ + m￿R)
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿(Rm + ￿w)
(21)
Because our equilibrium describes a situation where fertility is constant and
consumption is growing at a constant rate g it describes the situation of a
balanced growth path.
Now we are in the position to analyze the impact of the intrafamilial pension
system contribution rate ￿ on the equilibrium values. From equation (20) we





Proposition 1 Informally ￿nanced pension system contributions in the form of
gifts from adult children to their parents lead to decreasing per capita production
growth.
To understand the underlying dynamics the growth determining variables
11savings and fertility have to be examined. Use optimal savings, Wt+1 = gWt
and equation (20) to get:
st =
m￿(1 ￿ ￿)RWt
(1 + ￿ + ￿)(w￿ + mR)
Now derive savings with respect to ￿ to see that positive pension contributions
￿ > 0 lead to decreasing savings. Pension contributions ￿nanced through gifts









Proposition 2 Informal, gift based pension contributions are crowding out sav-
ings.





(￿ + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)w
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿(Rm + ￿w)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)w(w(￿ + ￿)￿ + m￿R)
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿(Rm + ￿w)2 (23)
￿
w(￿ + ￿)￿ + m￿R
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿(Rm + ￿w)
=
m(￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿)Rw ￿ m2￿R2 ￿ (￿ + ￿)w2￿2
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿(Rm + ￿w)2
The derivation of fertility with respect to ￿ shows, that informally ￿nanced
contributions can lead to higher or lower fertility depending on the strength
of the underlying e⁄ects on adult and retirement budget. While the e⁄ect on
adult budget is clearly fertility decreasing because adult budget goes down, the
e⁄ect on retirement budget is twofold. The retirement period e⁄ects can be
summarized by the change of the insurance value of a child. While increasing
pension contributions clearly increase the insurance value if contributions are
lump sum this is not the case for our framework of wage dependent contribu-
tions where growth is determining future adult income. Here increasing pension
contributions similar to the lump sum case increase the base of payments but
also decrease their interest since children￿ s adult income is lower due to reduced
growth (see equation 22). The overall retirement budget e⁄ect on fertility can
12be negative or positive. Because the retirement budget e⁄ect is dependent on
the values of ￿;￿;R;w;m,￿;￿, the overall fertility e⁄ect captured by equation
(23) is also variable dependent.
Proposition 3 Depending on whether m(￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿)Rw ￿ m2￿R2 ￿ (￿ +
￿)w2￿2 is bigger or smaller than 0 an informal pension system leads to increas-
ing or decreasing fertility.
Independent of variable values, ￿ > 0 leads to lower economic growth (22).
Therefore the case where m(￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿)Rw ￿ m2￿R2 ￿ (￿ + ￿)w2￿2 < 0
(informal pension system decreases fertility) implies that the growth decreasing
e⁄ect of lower savings is dominant. If m(￿ ￿ 2￿￿ ￿ 2￿￿)Rw ￿ m2￿R2 ￿ (￿ +
￿)w2￿2 > 0, fertility- and savings e⁄ect are both growth increasing (fertility
decreases and savings increase).
2.2 Pay-as-you-go public pension system
In this sub chapter we focus on fertility and growth implications caused by a pay-
as-you-go pension system. In reality children support their parents for di⁄erent
reasons.On the one hand ascending transfers can be motivated by altruism, tak-
ing place only because parents are in need. On the other hand transfers can be
part of an intergenerational exchange incorporating a connection between trans-
fers and bequests. Since we exclude bequest from the analysis our model only
captures the altruistic transfer motive. If in this framework the state steps in
and introduces a public pension system, implying that parents get a guaranteed
certain minimum wage, donors (adult children) no longer see the need to provide
transfers. A public pension system therefore completely crowds out transfers
(gifts) from adult children to their parents. In contrast to the developing econ-
omy scenario, pension bene￿ts are now not dependent on own fertility decisions
nt but on average fertility of the whole economy ￿ nt. Furthermore pensions are
also independent of the future adult income of the own child. In a public pen-
sion system the average future income ￿ Wt+1 of children instead of Wt+1 enters
the pension bene￿t formula. The re￿ ection of the transfer crowding out e⁄ect
through public pension systems is the main di⁄erence between this part of our
work and the paper by Wigger (1999).A balanced budget pay-as-you-go public
pension system demands:
￿t+1 = ￿￿ nt ￿ Wt+1
13While production sector and capital market stay the same the described
change in the pension system funding changes the household optimization prob-
lem.
2.2.1 Households
The crowding out of private intergenerational transfers through a public pension
system has a big in￿ uence on the value of a child. Pension bene￿ts are now
independent of own fertility decisions and agents do not incorporate the old age
security motive of fertility in their fertility decisions. This change is represented
in the retirement budget constraint ct+1. Notice that ￿ is now a policy decision
variable instead of a socially determined rate.
Vt = log(ct) + ￿ log(ct+1) + ￿ log(nt)
ct = Wt(1 ￿ ￿nt ￿ ￿) ￿ st
ct+1 = stRt+1 + ￿￿ nt ￿ Wt+1











While the ￿rst equation handling the optimal split between present and
future consumption is the same as in the informal pension contribution scenario,
the second equation dealing with cost and bene￿t of having children changes.
This fact is due to the change in marginal bene￿t of having children which now
only re￿ ects the consumption good motive. The insurance motive of fertility
becomes obsolete.
Because our model economy assumes homogeneous agents one can set ￿ nt and
￿ Wt+1 equal to nt and Wt+1 after the optimization. Solving the two equations
for fertility and savings gives us the following optimal household decisions:
st =
(1 ￿ ￿)Wt(￿￿Wt+1 ￿ ￿￿Rt+1Wt)
￿￿Wt+1 ￿ (1 + ￿ + ￿)￿Rt+1Wt
14nt =
￿Rt+1(1 ￿ ￿)Wt
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿Rt+1Wt ￿ ￿￿Wt+1
Like in the previous case negative aggregate savings are not possible implying
that the marginal opportunity cost of having a child ￿￿R have to be higher or
equal to the marginal bene￿t of procreation ￿￿g. Otherwise saving decisions
would become zero or negative and the whole adult income would be used only
for consumption, child rearing and pension contributions.
￿￿R > ￿￿g (24)
The condition for positive and ￿nite fertility (1 + ￿ + ￿)￿R > ￿￿g is like
in the previous model weaker and included in the condition for non-negativity
of st. Notice that we again assume positive savings, implying that we abstract
from the equality sign in (24). Well behaved savings and fertility demand:
￿￿R > ￿￿g
This allows us to de￿ne the maximum limit of pension contribution tax rate
￿ for the pa-as-you-go scenario which is higher than the maximum level in the
case of the informal pension system. ￿ can not be higher than the fraction
￿￿R
￿g .
Otherwise investment in savings would pay less than investment in fertility and





To calculate per capita production growth use the relationship between savings,
fertility and labor productivity (g = st
ntAtm) resulting from capital market equi-
librium and input prices . Now close the model by including the agent￿ s optimal

















15Use the result for g to obtain optimal fertility. This shows that our equilibrium
again describes the situation of a balanced growth path, because also fertility is
constant.
n =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
￿((1 + ￿ + ￿)mR + (1 + ￿)￿w)
(26)
Now we are in the position to analyze the impact of the pension system on
growth. Use the ￿rst derivative of equation (25) with respect to ￿ to show that




Proposition 4 A pay-as-you-go pension system decreases economic growth.
The reason for this negative impact lies again in the behavior of fertility and
savings. Use Wtg = Wt+1 and equation (25) to reformulate optimal savings.
st =
m￿RWt(1 ￿ ￿)
mR(1 + ￿ + ￿) + ￿w(1 + ￿)





m￿RWt(w(1 + ￿) + m(1 + ￿ + ￿)R)




Proposition 5 A pay-as-you-go pension system leads to lower savings since
resources are intergenerationally redistributed from young to old. This crowds
out private savings and reduces capital accumulation.
Our assumption that a public pension system fully crowds out private in-
trafamilial gifts is the reason why the savings reducing e⁄ect of pay-as-you-go
contributions can not be o⁄set by reduced gifts like in Yoon, Talmain (2001).
To see the e⁄ect of a pay-as-you-go pension system on fertility, derive (26)




￿(m2R2(1 + ￿ + ￿) + mRw(2￿(1 + ￿) + ￿(2￿ ￿ 1)) + ￿2w2(1 + ￿))
￿(mR(1 + ￿ + ￿) + ￿w(1 + ￿))2
16Similar to the informal pension system, a pay-as-you-go ￿nanced pension
system has positive and negative fertility e⁄ects. It decreases the adult bud-
get while the retirement budget can again increase or decrease depending on
the strength of interest and base of pension payments e⁄ects. The possible de-
creasing retirement income e⁄ect again incorporates the link between economic
growth and fertility. Because the pension system acts growth diminishing, the
interest of pension contributions decreases while the base of pension paments is
increasing.
The overall fertility e⁄ect is again dependent on the variable values of R;m;w;￿;￿;￿
and ￿. The variable values decide whether the fertility increasing e⁄ect of higher
pension payments base or the fertility decreasing e⁄ects of lower pension con-
tribution interest payments and lower adult budget are dominant.
Proposition 6 Depending on whether ￿￿(m2(1 + ￿ + ￿)R2 + m(2(1 + ￿)￿ +
￿(2￿￿1))Rw+(1+￿)￿2w2) is bigger or smaller than 0, a pay-as-you-go pension
system leads to an increase or a decrease of fertility.
Notice that if ￿￿(m2(1 + ￿ + ￿)R2 + m(2(1 + ￿)￿ + ￿(2￿ ￿ 1))Rw + (1 +
￿)￿2w2) < 0 implying that @n
@￿ < 0 the savings reducing e⁄ect of a pay-as-you-go
pension system is stronger than the fertility decreasing e⁄ect because the overall
growth e⁄ect is always negative (
@g
@￿ < 0).
2.3 Fully funded public pension system
Following the already stressed argument that intrafamilial gifts are not con-
sidered in the household optimization if a public pension systems is present,
we assume fully crowded out private intergenerational transfers. Compared to
the previous sub chapter only the retirement budget constraint and the capi-
tal market equilibrium change. Pension bene￿ts are now ￿nanced through own
contributions during adulthood which are invested in the capital market, pay-
ing the gross interest rate Rt+1. This clearly also changes the capital market
equilibrium because the additional investments have to be considered. Notice
that we again assume perfect foresight.
The balanced budget pension system constraint changes to:
￿t+1 = ￿ ￿ WtRt+1
17Capital market equilibrium is represented through:
Kt+1 = Nt(st + ￿Wt)
2.3.1 Households
A fully funded pension system abstracts from the idea of intergenerational trans-
fers. The system ￿nances future pension bene￿ts through own mandatory con-
tributions which are invested in the capital market. Because no transfers from
children to their parents are taking place fertility completely exits the retirement
budget constraint.
Vt = log(ct) + ￿ log(ct+1) + ￿ log(nt)
ct = Wt(1 ￿ ￿nt ￿ ￿) ￿ st
ct+1 = stRt+1 + ￿Rt+1 ￿ Wt
Like in the previous scenarios the ￿rst order conditions again control the
equalization between marginal bene￿t over time and between the two di⁄erent



















(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿
Aggregate savings are positive as long as ￿ > ￿(1 + ￿ + ￿). Therefore the
maximum pension contribution tax is determined by:
￿max =
￿
(1 + ￿ + ￿)
182.3.2 Equilibrium











Use optimal fertility and savings decision to show that g is again constant.





Growth and fertility are independent of ￿, implying that a fully funded
pension system has no in￿ uence on their equilibrium values. The only e⁄ect of
the funded pension system is the reduction of savings which is equivalent to the
amount of pension contributions. Pension contributions, invested in the capital
market exactly work like savings o⁄setting the impact of fully funded pension
contributions on capital accumulation. Consumers anticipate additional future
payments and therefore reduce savings exactly by the same amount reproducing
the Ricardian equivalence theorem which states that economic growth is neutral







Proposition 7 A fully funded pension system has no impact on economic growth
and fertility.
3 Public pension system implementation
This section highlights the impact of di⁄erent types of pension system introduc-
tions on per capita production growth and fertility. For this reason we bring our
already obtained results together and compare. In the ￿rst step an informally
organized pension system is compared to a pay-as-you-go public pension system.
Variables with indices inf and pay respectively indicate the informal and pay-as-
you-go case. For a direct comparison of the results one has to assume that the
part of income used for private intergenerational gifts ￿ of the informal system is
equal to the pension contribution tax rate ￿ of the pay-as-you-go system. This
implies an equal level of adult pension contributions for both pension systems.
All other variables are assumed to be independent of the pension system type.
19To analyze growth implications, one has to start by examining the e⁄ects on
fertility and savings. Fertility of the two pension systems is represented by:
ninf =
(1 ￿ ￿)(w(￿ + ￿)￿ + m￿R)
￿(1 + ￿ + ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
npay =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
￿((1 + ￿ + ￿)mR + (1 + ￿)￿w)
Proposition 8 An introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an econ-





This is the case since the fertility increasing old age security motive is com-
pletely crowded out by the public pension system.







(1+￿+￿)mR+(1+￿)￿w | {z }
>1
￿
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w)





Since the ￿rst term is bigger than 1 informal fertility is higher than pay-as-you-
go fertility (ninf > npay).
As we assumed for an economy without a public pension system own chil-
dren are ￿nancing the pensions of their parents. Fertility decision have therefore
a direct in￿ uence on retirement period consumption which will be reconsidered
in the optimization process. A pay-as-you-go public pension system ￿nances
pensions through the average number of children. Therefore instead of own the
average number of fertility enters the retirement budget constraint neglecting
the security motive of fertility in the household optimization. In other words,
economies with a pay-as-you-go public pension system are represented by house-
holds which do not expect own fertility decisions to have an in￿ uence on their
pension bene￿ts. Households living in an economy with informal pension sys-
tem clearly do so because their pensions bene￿ts are paid directly by their own
children. This leads to the feature of our model that marginal bene￿ts of pro-
creation are decreasing if a public pension system is introduced because the
security value of fertility cancels out.
20Now compare savings sinf
t and s
pay
t to see that the introduction of a pay-as-









mR(1 + ￿ + ￿) + ￿w(1 + ￿)
Proposition 9 An introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an econ-




The positive change in savings is due to the fact that the public pension
system reduces the crowding out e⁄ect of intergenerational transfers on savings.
This is the case because the decreasing e⁄ect of the public system on the value
of a child transfers income from procreation to savings.
After the examination of savings and fertility we are in the position to an-
alyze impacts on economic growth. The informal and pay-as-you-go cases are
represented by the following growth rates:
ginf =
￿￿Rw




Proposition 10 The introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension system to an
economy with informal pension system increases economic growth since fertility
decreases and savings increase (ginf < gpay).
The absence of private altruistic transfers from children to the old leads
to positive impacts on both growth determining e⁄ects. Savings go up and
fertility goes down. Our outcomes are closely connected to the results derived
by Zhang and Zhang (1995) who show that a pay-as-you-go public pension
system increases per capita output growth and reduces fertility compared to a
fertility related security system. In contrast to Zhang and Zhang we do not only
model ascending altruism from adult to old but also descending altruism from
adult to the young by including the consumption good motive of fertility. This
enables us to study the pay-as-you-go public pension system with endogenous
fertility in the framework of fully crowded out private transfers. Because Zhang
and Zhang are only modeling the security value of children they can not cover
21this case because the marginal bene￿t of procreation would become zero.Their
model can be seen as covering the transition period between an informal system
and a public pension system where private gifts are still positive nevertheless a
public social security system is already present. Our model is focusing on the
￿nal period when the transition is already ￿nished. The di⁄erent periods could
be reasoned by di⁄erent levels of trust in the public pension system. People do
not fully trust the public system during the adjustment period and therefore
still support their parents with private gifts. The ￿nal period is characterized
by zero gifts because the households have already adjusted their behavior. Our
assumption of fully crowded out private gifts does not change the direction of the
growth e⁄ect but changes its level. Pay-as-you-go pension system introduction
leads in our model to lower future capital compared to an informal pension
system and therefore to lower growth compared to Zhang and Zhang. This is
the case because the Zhang and Zhang model compensates the negative e⁄ect of
pension contributions on capital accumulation through a decrease of gifts while
this is not possible in our model since we assume already fully crowded out gifts.
After clarifying the growth and fertility impacts caused by a pay-as-you-
go public pension system introduction to an informal pension system economy
we focus towards the impacts of the introduction of a fully funded (index ff)
public pension system which is the most prominent alternative to a pay-as-you-
go public pension system in reality. Use the results from the pervious chapters
to describe informal and fully funded fertility:
ninf =
(1 ￿ ￿)(w(￿ + ￿)￿ + m￿R)
￿(1 + ￿ + ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
nff =
￿
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿
Proposition 11 The level of pension system contribution tax ￿ decides about
whether the introduction of a fully funded system to an economy without working












w(￿+￿) results in lower informal fertility than fully






22Proof. Rewrite informal fertility to get:
ninf =
￿
￿(1 + ￿ + ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(w￿￿ 1
￿ + w￿ + mR)
(Rm + ￿w)
For positive pension contributions three cases are observable:




w(￿+￿), the second term of ninf is bigger than 1 and
ninf > nff.








w(￿+￿), the second term of ninf is
smaller than 1 and ninf < nff.




w(￿+￿), the second term of ninf cancels out and
ninf = nff.
The di⁄erent cases are showing that the amount of income contributed to the
pension system decides whether fertility is higher or lower. This is the case be-
cause informal fertility can decrease or increase depending on the variable values
which decide about whether the decreasing e⁄ect on informal growth and avail-
able adult income or the increasing e⁄ect on pension payments base is stronger.




w(￿+￿). In this case informal





w(￿+￿) the e⁄ect of lower informal growth and lower available
adult income is weaker than the e⁄ect due to increasing pension payments base





implies exactly the opposite leading to lower informal fertility than fully funded
fertility.
After the description of the growth determining fertility e⁄ect we focus to-
wards the capital accumulation e⁄ect to fully understand the overall growth
e⁄ect. A fully funded pension system invests the whole part of income reserved
for retirement consumption in the capital market and therefore reaches the
same capital stock than without a pension system. Capital holdings are clearly
higher than in the informal case leading to a growth enhancing e⁄ect since in
the Grossmann Yanagawa endogenous growth model growth is driven by labor
productivity that is determined by capital intensity.
23ginf =
￿￿Rw





Proposition 12 The introduction of a fully funded public pension system to an
economy with informal social security system leads to higher economic growth.
This implies that even for case 2 where fully funded fertility is higher, the
growth increasing e⁄ect of higher capital accumulation is dominant.
Now we are in the position to state that countries aiming to increase per
capita production growth should introduce a public pension system no mat-
ter whether the system is funded or unfunded. If the main goal is to decrease
population growth only the pay-as-you-go pension system is useful for all con-
tribution levels. To draw light on the question whether it is better to introduce
a funded or unfunded system we now focus on the comparison of the two public
pension systems.
Pay-as-you-go fertility and fully funded fertility are represented through:
npay =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
￿((1 + ￿ + ￿)mR + (1 + ￿)￿w)
nff =
￿
(1 + ￿ + ￿)￿
Proposition 13 The tax rate level ￿ decides about whether pay-as-you-go fer-











w fertility is lower in the pay-as-you-go system (npay < nff).
For the case where ￿ =
￿
(1+￿+￿) ￿ Rm
w both systems lead to identical fertility
decisions.
Proof. Reformulate pay-as-you-go fertility to get:
npay =
￿
￿(1 + ￿ + ￿)
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w)
mR + (1 + ￿)￿w 1
(1+￿+￿)
Now check if the second term on the right side is smaller, bigger or equal to 1.
Therefore analyze if the nominator (1 ￿ ￿)(Rm + ￿w) is bigger or smaller than
24the denominator (mR + (1 + ￿)￿w 1
(1+￿+￿)).
￿ Case 1: if ￿ <
￿
(1+￿+￿) ￿ Rm
w the second term is bigger than 1 and npay >
nff.






w the second term is smaller
than 1 and npay < nff.
￿ Case 3: if ￿ =
￿
(1+￿+￿) ￿ Rm
w the second term is equal to 1 implying that
npay = nff.
The three cases are again dependent on the strength of the di⁄erent underly-
ing pay-as-you-go contribution payment e⁄ects on fertility. Case 3 corresponds
to the case where the fertility diminishing e⁄ect of lower growth and lower
available adult income is o⁄set by the fertility increasing e⁄ect of higher pen-
sion payments base. This is only possible if the overall insurance value of a child
and therefore also the retirement budget increases with an increase in contri-
bution payments. If ￿ >
￿
(1+￿+￿) ￿ Rm
w the negative growth and adult budget
e⁄ects on fertility are higher than the positive e⁄ect through higher pension
payments base implying that pay-as-you-go fertility is lower than fully funded
fertility. Case 2 describes the opposite leading to higher pay-as-you-go fertility
than fully funded fertility.
Now assume a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form:
F(AtLt;Kt) = K￿
t (AtLt)1￿￿
Use the results for factor prices w = m￿(1 ￿ ￿) and R = ￿m￿￿1 to refor-
mulate the threshold contribution level for the three above mentioned cases:
￿ R
￿




Because ￿;￿ and ￿ are assumed to be positive and smaller than 1, case 1 is
true implying that pay-as-you-go fertility is lower than fully funded fertility
(npay < nff) if we set ￿ equal to 1=3 which is standard in the literature.
Proposition 14 If the production function is Cobb-Douglas and ￿ = 1=3 pay-
as-you-go fertility is lower than fully funded fertility (npay < nff).
25While the general result for fertility comparison is case dependent, the result
for growth comparison is not. Per capita production growth corresponding to







Proposition 15 A pay-as-you-go pension system leads to lower economic growth
than a fully funded one (gpay < gff).
Our model therefore reproduces the classical result for models with exoge-
nous fertility by Feldstein (1998). From the derivation of growth we know two
growth e⁄ects. Capital accumulation is growth enhancing and fertility is growth
diminishing. If fully funded growth is always higher than pay-as-you-go growth
despite higher fully funded fertility for the Cobb-Douglas case with ￿ = 1=3,
fully funded capital accumulation has to be higher than the one for a pay-as-
you-go system. This is the case because the only possibility for the funded
pension system to beat the growth increasing e⁄ect of lower pay-as-you-go fer-
tility is to have an even stronger positive growth e⁄ect through higher future
capital. We follow that savings plus pension contributions corresponding to a
funded pension system are higher than savings for a pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem (s
ff
t + ￿Wt > s
pay
t ) for the described Cobb-Douglas production function.
To understand the result one has to examine the di⁄erent e⁄ects on capital
accumulation. While all pension contributions are always savings reducing be-
cause they transfer income to the future and reduce uncertainty, the type of
the system decides about the impact on capital accumulation. Fully funded
pension contributions exactly act like savings because they are invested in the
capital market and therefore do not change capital accumulation. In contrast
pay-as-you-go contributions which go directly from the adults to the old reduce
future capital despite the fact that pay-as-you-go savings can be higher than
fully funded. This is the case because contributions are not invested in the cap-
ital market and the savings reducing e⁄ect of pension contributions can not be
o⁄set.
The result that pay-as-you-go-growth is always lower than fully funded growth
further implies that the growth enhancing e⁄ect of lower pay-as-you-go fertility
can not compensate the growth decreasing e⁄ect of lower pay-as-you-go future
26capital. This is contrary to the ￿ndings of Yoon,Talmain (2001) who study
exactly the same question similar to the already mentioned Zhang and Zhang
model in a positive private transfer framework without descending altruism. The
di⁄erent result is again driven by our assumption of zero interfamilial intergen-
erational transfers which omits the growth increasing e⁄ect of gift reductions.
4 Numerical Example
The theoretical results obtained in the previous sections show that pension
systems in￿ uence growth through impacts on fertility and capital accumulation.
While the growth impacts of the di⁄erent pension systems can clearly be ranked,
the variable values of R;m;w;￿;￿ and ￿ decide about whether fully funded
fertility is higher or smaller than informal fertility. To answer this question, we
calibrate our model for an average Sub-Saharan as well as for an average OECD
country inside a Cobb-Douglas production function economy.
We further use the calibrated model to produce new insights in the observed
fertility and growth di⁄erences for the United States and Europe.
4.1 Calibration
The parameters are chosen such that the balanced growth path equilibrium
matches the empirical features of an average OECD country with a pay-as-you-
go pension system. Adult and retirement period have a length of 30 years,
childhood of 15 years implying a life expectancy of 75 years. Due to empirical
￿ndings we set capital productivity ￿ equal to 1=3. The discount factor ￿
is assumed to be 0:99 per quarter of a year corresponding to the standard
real-business-cycle literature. In our 30 years per adult period framework this
corresponds to 0:99120. Following Doepke and Croix (2003) child rearing cost,
measured through the time parameter ￿, corresponds to 15% of adult working
time. Since we assumed that childhood only lasts for 15 years ￿ is set equal to
0:075. Pension contribution rate ￿ is chosen to be equal to the OECD average
of 30%. This number together with the child rearing cost limits maximum
fertility to 5:7 children per person. We further choose the descending altruism
factor ￿ to be 0:142 and the technology parameter m controlling the in￿ uence
of capital intensity equal to 0:0069 because these variable reproduce a steady
state fertility rate at the reproduction level nt = 1 and a steady state per capita
output growth rate of 2% per year. The values of m and ￿ are further implying
27an interest rate of 7:67%.
The chosen variable values reproduce our theoretical result that the pay-
as-you-go system leads to lowest fertility. Additionally we show that for the
observed contribution rate informal fertility is clearly higher than fully funded
fertility. This is the case since the fertility increasing e⁄ects of higher pension
payments base is dominating the fertility decreasing e⁄ect of reduced growth
and adult budget. Only if pension contributions are unrealistically higher than
51:6% of adult income the fully funded system produces higher fertility than the
informal one (see table 1). Since aggregate savings can not be negative these
cases can be excluded and we follow that informal fertility is higher than fully
funded fertility.
Table 1: Fertility dependence on ￿ ￿ = 0:3 ￿ = 0:516 ￿ = 0:7
nt gt nt gt nt gt
Informal Pension System 1:65 1:01 1:31 0:69 0:88 0:54
Pay-as-you-go Pension System 1 1:81 0:71 1:43 0:45 1:21
Fully Funded Pension System 1:32 2:9 1:32 2:9 1:32 2:9
Graphical examination of the results (see ￿gure 1) shows that informal fer-
tility creates a hump shaped curve in a fertility and pension contribution rate
plane. The behavior of the curve is re￿ ecting the strength of the underlying ef-
fects which are dependent on the level of pension contributions ￿. Hump shaped
behavior can only be observed for the informal pension system where the old age
security motive is still present. As the contribution payments per child increase
the insurance motive becomes less important while the negative growth e⁄ect
becomes stronger. At the fertility maximum the e⁄ects are o⁄set. A further
increase of ￿ leads to decreasing fertility. Despite the narrow scope of our sim-
ple analysis the comparison of fully funded and pay-as-you-go fertility suggests
that fertility di⁄erences between the US and Europe can partly be explained by
the di⁄erent types and not only by the di⁄erent contribution levels ( Boldrin,
De Nardi and Jones (2005)) of pension systems. The US, where pensions are
mainly ￿nanced through a funded system show a Total Fertility Rate (TFR)
of 2, while Europe, represented through mainly pay-as-you-go pension systems,
shows a TFR of 1.4.
28Figure 1:















Figure 2 shows the growth diminishing e⁄ect of an increase in the pension
contribution rate for an informal and a pay-as-you-go pension system. Like
in the theoretical results, the pay-as-you-go growth level is always higher than
the informal one since growth reducing fertility is lower and growth increasing
savings are higher. If the contribution rate is too high the informal as well as
the pay-as-you-go pension system could lead to negative growth. Fully funded
growth is graphically represented by a horizontal line since it is independent on
the pension contribution rate.
This suggests that also growth di⁄erences are dependent on the type of
pension system. Higher US growth compared to European growth can therefore
partly be explained by the regions di⁄erences in pension funding.
Figure 2:












29The second numeric example is dealing with developing countries. There-
fore the parameters are chosen such that the balanced growth path equilibrium
matches the empirical features of an average Sub-Saharan country. Adult and
retirement period have a length of 15 years, childhood of 10 years which is im-
plying a life expectancy of 40 years. Capital productivity and the discount rate
per quarter are equal to the OECD case (￿ = 1=3 and ￿ = 0:99). In our 15 years
adulthood and retirement age framework the discount rate corresponds to the
value ￿ = 0:9960. Child cost measured through the parameter ￿ are expected
to be lower than for the OECD case since in informally organized societies
children are looked after by a broader sense of the family which can even take
the form of a village unity. Taking the above 7:5% of working time for OECD
Countries into account we choose child raring cost for developing countries to
be less than the OECD level and set ￿ equal to 0:042. This number leads to-
gether with the observed fertility rate of 2:75 4 to a descending altruism factor
￿ equal to 0:117 which is only slightly smaller than the value for the OECD
case. This is creating additional support for our child rearing cost choice since
we can not see any reason why descending altruism representing the genetic
imprint to procreate should be much di⁄erent for developing countries. The
parameterization of ￿ for the developing case is quite tricky since no data about
social mandatory contribution is available. Therefore we again use the observed
average bene￿ts for OECD countries which are around 30% of working income
and divide them through the steady state level of fertility to get ￿ = 0:11. We
implicitly assume that 30% of adult working income plus the own fruit of sav-
ings are high enough to ￿nance a su¢ cient level of retirement consumption. We
further use the growth rate of 0:6%5 per year to set the technology parameter
m, controlling the in￿ uence of capital intensity on labor productivity, equal to
0:012. The technology parameter which is governing the transition of capital
intensity to labor productivity m is higher than the OECD one, implying the
lower technological standard. Our numerical developing country example im-
plies an interest rate of close to 13% what can partly be justi￿ed by existing
risk prime.
Our variable values again result in lowest fertility for the fully funded system
(see table 2). An unrealistically high contribution rate of ￿ = 73:5% is needed
to equal fertility levels for the informal and fully funded pension system. Posi-
tive aggregate savings again exclude these high levels of the contribution rate.
4World Population Data Sheet 2006.
5Sub-Saharan average for 1990-2004.
30Our example therefore implies that the informal pension system leads to lower
fertility than the fully funded one.
Table 2: Fertility dependence on ￿ ￿ = 0:11 ￿ = 73:5 ￿ = 0:8
nt gt nt gt nt gt
Informal Pension System 2:75 1:09 1:68 0:26 1:3 0:24
Pay-as-you-go Pension System 1:59 2:01 0:55 0:99 0:42 0:95
Fully Funded Pension System 1:68 2:46 1:68 2:46 1:68 2:46
Graphical examination of the outcomes (see ￿gure 3) shows that pay-as-you-
go fertility and informal fertility, drawn in a fertility and pension contribution
rate plane, create a hump shaped curve. Increasing pension contribution rates
are leading to increasing fertility as long as the positive utility e⁄ect through
higher retirement budget is dominant. At the maximum the increasing e⁄ects
are o⁄set by the decreasing growth and adult budget e⁄ects. From this level of
￿ onwards fertility is decreasing.
Figure 3:















Figure 4 shows the growth diminishing e⁄ect of an increase in the pension
contribution rate for an informal and a pay-as-you-go system. Like in the theo-
retical results prompted the pay-as-you-go growth level is always higher than the
informal one since growth reducing fertility is lower and growth enhancing sav-
ings are higher. Fully funded growth is graphically represented by a horizontal
line since it is independent on the pension contribution rate.
Now we are in the position to give a full description of pension system
impacts to a developing economy. The fully funded Pension system clearly
leads to highest economic growth while the pay-as-you-go one produces lowest
31fertility. Dependent on whether the reduction in fertility or the increase of per
capita growth is the main task of the governmental program the pay-as-you-
go or fully funded system should be introduced. Independent on this question
any of the two described public pension systems lead compared to an informal
pension system to a preferable outcome.
Figure 4:















In this paper we addressed two important questions concerning the in￿ uence
of di⁄erent pension systems on economic growth and fertility. The ￿rst deals
with the consequences of public pension system introduction to a developing
economy represented by an informal pension system, the second adresses which
of the two public pension systems is preferable.
We show that no matter if the introduced public system is funded or pay-as-
you-go the consequences on economic growth are positive. The theoretical re-
sults for a pay-as-you-go pension system introduction highlight that both growth
determining e⁄ects, capital accumulation and fertility, are growth enhancing
while two implied growth e⁄ects of a fully funded pension system introduction
are not that clear. A fully funded pension system is increasing capital accumu-
lation while fertility can be higher or lower depending on the level of pension
contribution ￿. The overall e⁄ect of a fully funded pension system introduction
on economic growth is positive for all cases indicating that the growth enhanc-
ing e⁄ect of higher future capital is dominating the possible growth diminishing
32e⁄ect of higher fertility. The numerical example at the end of the study shows,
that for realistic contribution levels the case of higher fertility can be excluded.
Within the debate about the impact of di⁄erent public pension systems on
growth, works incorporating endogenous determined fertility (Zhang and Zhang
(1995), Yoon and Talmain (2001)) usually create the result that a pay-as-you-
go public pension system implies higher growth than a fully funded one. Our
work contributes to the topic by showing that the growth enhancing e⁄ect of
a pay-as-you-go pension system is only driven by the inclusion of intrafamilial
intergenerational gifts. The use of a mixed procreation motive (Wigger (1999))
allows us to study the in￿ uence of pension systems on growth and fertility in a
framework of fully crowded out gifts. This creates the result that a fully funded
pension system implies higher growth than a pay-as-you-go one reestablishing
the conventional "exogenous fertility view" of a growth diminishing pay-as-you-
go pension system (Feldstein and Samwick (1998)). The reult is implying that
the growth increasing lower pay-as-you-go fertility can not outweight the growth
decreasing e⁄ect of lower capital accumulation if no private interfamilial trans-
fers take place. Developing countries which are especially crippled by high
population growth can therefore be better o⁄ by introducing a pay-as-you-go
instead of a fully funded pension system despite the corresponding lower eco-
nomic growth.
The numerical example quanti￿es the impacts of the di⁄erent pension sys-
tems and highlights that a part of the growth and fertility di⁄erences observed
for the US and Europe can solely be explained by the di⁄erent types of pension
system even if the contribution rates are exactly the same.
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